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Abstract	This	article	attempts	to	rethink	a	notion	of	resistance	for	contemporary	forms	of	dissent	and	 opposition	 that	 are	 increasingly	 organised	 through	 digital	 media	 and	 networks.	Applying	a	post-human	compass	on	hacking,	a	processual	reading	of	the	hack	is	implied	to	propose	a	movement	towards	the	idea	of	hacktions.	Hacktions	are	networked	media	actions	 that	 involve	 an	 aesthetic	 register	 of	 de-subjective	 creativity,	 aiming	 towards	systematic	disruptions:	the	active	resistances	of	a	media	ecological	dysfunctionality.			 	We	 do	 not	 lack	 communication.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 we	 have	 too	much	of	it.	We	lack	creation.	We	lack	resistance	to	the	present.		Gilles	Deleuze	and	Félix	Guattari1		
0.	Introduction,	or	the	necessary	movements		In	 contemporary	 societies,	 digital	 networks	 have	 increasingly	 become	 a	‘battlefield’	where,	following	the	emergence	of	novel	power	relations,	new	forms	of	resistance	have	come	to	the	fore.	Domination,	discipline	and	power-over	have	not	 disappeared,	 but	 are	 aligned	 by	 new	 patterns	 of	 anticipatory	 control,	governmentality	and	machinic	enslavement.2	These	are	power	mechanisms	that	take	advantage	of	the	pervasiveness	of	media	technologies:	what	might	be	called,	following	 Nigel	 Thrift	 and/or	 Katherine	 Hayles,	 a	 distributed	 technological	
																																																						1	Gilles	Deleuze	and	Félix	Guattari,	What	 is	Philosophy?,	 transl.	by	H.	Tomlinson	and	G.	Burchell	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1994	[1991]),	108.	2	 On	 pre-emption	 see	 Greg	 Elemer	 and	 Andy	 Opel,	 “Surviving	 the	 Inevitable	 Future,”	 Cultural	
Studies,	 20	 (2006)	 4-5:	 477-492;	 and	 Richard	 Grusin,	 Premediation.	 Affect	 and	 mediality	 after	
9/11	 (Basingstoke:	 Palgrave	Macmillan,	 2010).	 On	 algorithmic	 governmentality	 see	 Antoniette	Rouvroy	and	Thomas	Berns,	“Gouvernementalité	Algorithmique	et	Perspectives	d’Émancipation,”	
Réseaux,	177	(2013)	1:	163-196;	and	“Le	Nouveau	Pouvoir	Statistique,”	Multitudes,	40	(2010)	1:	88-103.	On	machinic	enslavement	see	Maurizio	Lazzarato,	Signs	and	Machines:	Capitalism	and	the	
Production	of	Subjectivity	(Los	Angeles:	Semiotext(e),	2014).	
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‘unconsciousness’	 or	 ‘nonconsciousness’.3	 In	 parallel,	 political	 dissent	 and	opposition	have	been	rethought	and	re-arranged	 in	several	ways.	Many	a	 time,	this	rearrangement	does	not	follow	the	simple	use	of	media	as	communicational	tools,	 instead	deploying	 them	as	 ‘weapons’,	moving	beyond	representation	and	exploiting	the	performativity	of	media	objects	and	processes.4	An	example	is	the	forms	of	dissent	that	are	organised	under	the	‘Anonymous’	moniker,	which	take	advantage	 of	 the	 mass	 distribution	 and	 central	 position,	 in	 contemporary	societies,	of	digital	media	and	networks,	to	carry	out	a	multiplicity	of	politically-oriented	media	 actions.5	 These	media	 forms	do	not	 have	 communicative	 aims;	they	are	processes	of	mediation	that	act	on	the	distributed	materiality	of	digital	networks,	 disrupting	 and	 challenging	 the	 hyper-connectivity	 which	contemporary	forms	of	power,	many	a	time,	rely	on.		It	is	not	within	the	scope	of	this	paper	to	shed	light	on	and	empirically	examine	such	 forms	 of	 political	 dissent	 that	 are	 actualised	 through	 digital	 media	 and	networks.	Rather,	I	am	going	to	focus	on	some	of	the	theoretical	premises	that	I	argue	 are	 needed	 to	 conceptualise	 resistance	 in	 contemporary	 network	ecologies.	 The	objective	 is	 to	 speculatively	push	 towards	 the	 idea	of	hacktions,	which	I	suggest	is	a	key	conceptual	tool	to	think	about	resistance	through	digital	media	 and	 networks,	 within	 the	 broader	 aim	 of	 advancing	 the	 study	 of	 the	politics	of	media	dissent.	The	starting	point	will	be	the	world	of	hacking,	and	in	particular	‘the	hack’:	the	cornerstone	of	hacker	culture.	However,	I	will	contend	that	 an	 approach	 to	 the	 cultures	 of	 hacking	 needs	 to	 take	 seriously	 in	consideration	the	developments	of	the	field	of	post-humanities,	which	imply	an	anti-anthropocentric	 conception	 of	 culture.	 On	 such	 a	 line	 of	 argument,	 I	 will	concentrate	 the	 understanding	 of	 hacking	 beyond	 the	 field	 of	 computing,	addressing	 the	 hack	 as	 a	 material	 intervention	 capable	 of	 reaching	 disruptive	points	 of	 abstraction.	 The	 hack	 possesses	 a	 creational	 attitude	 that	 must	 be	acknowledged	 in	 motion:	 in	 the	 processes	 it	 is	 capable	 of	 actualising.	 The	conceptualisation	of	media	actions	of	resistance	as	hacktions	precisely	seeks	 to	comprehend	 how	 hacking	 media	 practices	 can,	 or	 cannot,	 originate	 resistant	disruptions	 by	 processually	 and	 relationally	 involving	 human	 practitioners,	media	objects	and	possible	material	dysfunctions	amongst	many	–	which	means	always	 implying	nonlinear	 interactions	 and	processes	 of	 co-emergence.	Within	hacktions	 –	 I	 propose	 –	 resistance	 to	 domination	 implies	 active	 forces	 that	ethologically	 entangle	 the	 materiality	 of	 various	 bodies,	 having	 an	 affective	aesthetics	 that	 is	 capable	 of	 triggering	 certain	 tendencies	 of	 media	disruptiveness.	
																																																						3	See	Nigel	Thrift,	Knowing	Capitalism	(London:	Sage,	2005)	and	Katherine	N.	Hayles	“Traumas	of	Code,”	Critical	Inquiry,	33	(2006):	136-157.	4	See	Alberto	Micali,	 “Hacktivism	and	 the	Heterogeneity	of	Resistance	 in	Digital	Cultures”	 (PhD	diss.,	University	of	Lincoln,	2016).	5	 See	 Gabriella	 E.	 Coleman,	Hacker,	 Hoaxer,	Whistleblower,	 Spy.	 The	Many	 Faces	 of	 Anonymous	(London	&	New	York:	Verso,	2014).	
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1.	Moving	from	the	hack:	a	view	on	post-humanities		 Mythologized	 in	 an	 elaborate	 oral	 and	 written	 tradition,	 the	ideal	of	the	hack	suffuses	the	hacker	culture.	It	embodies	shared	values	 and	 passions.	 And,	 of	 course,	 it	 is	 the	 centerpiece	 of	hacker	rituals.		 Sherry	Turkle6		To	hack	is	to	abstract.	To	abstract	is	to	produce	the	plane	upon	which	different	 things	may	enter	 into	 relation.	 It	 is	 to	produce	the	names	and	numbers,	the	locations	and	trajectories	of	those	things.	 It	 is	 to	 produce	 kinds	 of	 relations,	 and	 relations	 of	relations,	into	which	things	may	enter.		 McKenzie	Wark7		Hacker	 culture	 has	 been	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 intellectual	 and	 militant	 reflections	during	 the	 phase	 of	mass	 expansion	 of	 the	 internet.8	 Particularly,	 between	 the	millennium	turn	and	the	emergence	of	commercial,	social	networking	platforms,	several	 scholarly	 publications	 focused	 on	 hacking	 as	 an	 ethical,	 practical	 and	theoretical	 opportunity	 to	 reimagine	 societal	 relationships	 and	 reorganise	 the	social	 conflict	 within	 the	 networking	 paradigm.9	 Many	 critical	 accounts	addressed	 their	 reflections	 to	 the	 political	 promises	 of	 digital	 networks,	emphasising	the	political	potential	of	hacking.	Without	entering	into	the	details	of	 all	 these	 various	 positions,	 their	main	 concerns	with	 regard	 to	 the	 “idea	 of	hacker	 culture”	 have	 been	 summarised	 by	 Patrice	 Riemens.10	 According	 to	Riemens,	 hackers	 were	 often	 “[t]ransformed	 into	 role-models	 as	 effective	resistance	fighters	against	 ‘the	system’”:	a	 leading	oppositional	 force	within	so-called	 ‘digital	 resistance’.11	 Nevertheless,	 the	 politics	 of	 hacking	 are	 far	 from	homogeneous.	 As	 Gabriella	 Coleman	 points	 out,	 a	wide	 diversity	 characterises	
																																																						6	Sherry	Turkle,	The	Second	Self:	Computers	and	the	Human	Spirit,	Twentieth	Anniversary	Edition	(Cambridge,	MA	&	London:	MIT	Press,	2005	[1984]),	211.	7	 McKenzie	 Wark,	 A	 Hacker	 Manifesto	 (Cambridge:	 MA	 –	 London:	 Harvard	 University	 Press,	2004),	[083].	8	About	the	history	of	the	internet,	within	longer	historical	lineages,	I	follow	a	commonly	adopted	division	in	three	main	periods:	a	first	phase	inaugurated	by	the	military	complex	(from	Arpanet,	1969-1980/90),	 a	 second	 comprising	 research	 centres	 and	 telematics	 hobbyists	 (1980/90-2000),	 and	 a	 third	 of	 global	 diffusion	 and	 mass	 commercialisation	 (from	 2000).	 See	 Manuel	Castells,	The	Internet	Galaxy	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2001).	9	See	 for	 instance	Pekka	Himanen,	The	Hacker	Ethic	and	 the	Spirit	of	 the	 Information	Age	 (New	York:	 Random	 House,	 2001),	 Johan	 Söderberg,	Hacking	 Capitalism:	 The	 Free	 and	 Open	 Source	
Software	Movement	(London:	Routledge,	2008),	and	McKenzie	Wark,	A	Hacker	Manifesto.	10	Patrice	Riemens,	“Some	Thoughts	On	the	Idea	of	‘Hacker	Culture’,”	Anarchitexts:	Voices	from	the	
Global	Digital	Resistance,	ed.	J.	Richardson	(New	York:	Autonomedia,	2003),	327.	11	Ibid.,	328.	
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the	multiple	aspects,	richness	and	oftentimes	controversial	politics	of	hacking.12	Furthermore,	 once	 the	 almost	 complete	 commercialisation	 of	 the	 internet	 has	been	reached,	the	 influences	of	hacker	cultures	on	the	politics	of	media	dissent	have	 not	 extinguished	 their	 course.	 Nowadays,	 countless	 phenomena	 of	resistance	 through	 digital	 media	 and	 networks	 still	 retain	 their	 connection	 to	hacker	 culture,	 differentiating	 their	 forms	 of	 actualisation	 in	 a	 multiplicity	 of	arrangements.	An	instance	that	I	have	studied	thoroughly	elsewhere	is	the	digital	actions	such	as	those	that	are	deployed	under	the	‘Anonymous’	moniker,	which	embrace	hacking	media	practices	and	attitudes,	bringing	novel	resistances	to	the	fore.13	Despite	the	widespread	diffusion	of	similar	forms	of	media	opposition,	the	conceptualisation	 of	 a	 possible	 notion	 of	 resistance	 –	 an	 analytical	 tool	 that	would	be	constructive	 for	studying	and	grasping	the	capability	of	phenomenon	such	as	Anonymous	to	be	politically	effective	–	is	far	from	being	mature.		The	first	question	that	needs	to	be	advanced	revolves	around	the	idea	of	hacker	culture,	 and	 follows	 the	 development	 of	 post-human	 thought.14	 ‘Post-humanities’,	in	fact,	calls	into	question	the	same	conception	of	‘hacker	culture’	as	a	standard	set	of	social	practices,	community-based	rituals	and	human	habits.	As	maintained	by	post-human	propositions,	cultures	are	not	strictly	a	human	affair	and,	thus,	it	is	misleading	to	study	them	as	a	complex	of	social	variables	that	can	be	extracted	or	subtracted	 to	reduce	 their	complexity.	Cultural	expressions	are	not	constituted	via	an	anthropopoietic	process	that	closes	on	itself	and,	as	such,	hacker	culture	cannot	be	foreclosed	in	specific	instrumental	relations	that	define	human-technological	 practices,	 or	 modes	 of	 practising	 with	 computing	technologies.		In	his	seminal	study	on	hacker	culture,	Tim	Jordan	concludes	that	hacking	poses	a	“conceptual	difficulty”,	which	directly	involves	the	determinisms	that	for	 long	time	influenced	the	study	of	culture.15	According	to	Jordan,	hacking	implies	at	its	hart	 a	 “dynamic	 and	mutual	 determination	between	 society	 and	 technology”.16	Moving	from	Jordan’s	suggestion	towards	the	field	of	post-humanities,	it	is	key	to	recognise	 that	 determinisms	 are	 well	 rooted	 in	 humanist	 conceptions	 and,	particularly,	 support	dichotomic	 readings	 (such	as	 the	one	 that	 separates	non-human	animals	 from	human	ones,	 the	 latter	 from	 technologies,	or	nature	 from	culture,	 as	 antinomic	 poles)	 –	 interpretations	 that	 intensely	 characterise	
																																																						12	 Gabriella	 E.	 Coleman,	 Coding	 Freedom:	 The	 Ethics	 and	 Aesthetics	 of	 Hacking	 (Princeton	 and	Oxford:	Princeton	University	Press,	2013).	13	See	Micali,	op.	cit.	14	See	Katherine	N.	Hayles,	How	We	Became	Posthuman	 (Chicago	&	London:	Chicago	University	Press,	 1999);	 Roberto	Marchesini,	Post-Human.	 Verso	 nuovi	 modelli	 di	 esistenza	 (Turin:	 Bollati	Boringhieri,	2002);	Rosi	Braidotti,	The	Posthuman	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2013).	15	Tim	Jordan,	Hacking	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2008),	134.	16	Ibid.,	140.	
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anthropocentred	 epistemologies.17	 The	 two	 determinisms	 that	 signed	 the	progression	of	media	and	cultural	studies	during	the	1960s	and	’70s	carried	on	a	perspective	grounded	on	dichotomies	–	even	though	they	fostered	diametrically	opposite	positions.18	Whether	society	is	conceptualised	as	shaping	technology	or	–	 conversely	 –	 the	 latter	 as	 influencing	 and	 modifying	 the	 social	 tissue,	technologies	 are	 invariably	 characterised	as	being	dualistically	 something	else:	‘separated’	 technical	 objects,	 whose	 content	 can	 be	 analysed	 to	 assess	 their	cultural	 impact	 –	 or,	 contrariwise,	 which	 instrumental	 prosthetic	 involvement	can	be	studied	as	part	of	the	progression	of	the	human-animal.	Similarly,	hacker	cultures	have	for	long	time	been	delimited	to	distinct	social	groups,	which	could	be	 examined	 by	 reflecting	 upon	 instrumental	 relationships	 to	 computing	technologies.19		Proceeding	with	a	post-human	compass	on	hacking,	I	suggest	that	attention	must	first	 be	 given	 to	 the	 hack	 in	 order	 to	 rethink	 the	 concept	 of	 resistance	 for	contemporary	 forms	 of	 digital	 media	 dissent.	 The	 hack,	 in	 fact,	 is	 a	 material	gesture	used	by	many	scholars	to	approach	hacking	and	thus	stands	at	the	core	of	 the	 relations	 between	 knowledge	 and	 technics.20	 Hence,	 the	 hack	 seems	 to	express	 the	 potential	 of	 relationality	 of	 human-technological	 assemblages:21	 a	
																																																						17	The	 term	 ‘humanism’	delineates	a	 long	and	not	 isolated	 line	of	 thought	 that	proceeds	across	the	 long	course	of	Western	metaphysics.	This	 line	moves	 from	 the	ancient	Greeks	 (the	Sophist	and	 Socratics	 in	 the	 Fifth	 Century	 BC)	 through	 the	 current	 that	 is	more	 often	 associated	with	Italian	 Renaissance	 (Fourteenth	 Century	 AC)	 and	 reaches	 modernity,	 when	 the	 contrasts	between	applied	sciences	and	religion	arose,	strengthening	the	tendency	of	considering	human	rational	faculties	as	the	leading	source	of	agency.	According	to	Roberto	Marchesini,	it	is	thus	key	to	approach	the	humanist	paradigm	as	not	being	merely	a	form	of	thought	which	emerged	in	the	Fourteenth	 Century,	 but	 a	 “disjunctive	 philosophical	 coordinate”	 –	 which	 still	 permeates	contemporary	 reflections.	 See	 Roberto	Marchesini,	Epifania	 Animale	 (Milan	 &	 Udine:	Mimesis,	2014),	37.	18	The	writings	of	two	leading	figures	in	the	field	of	media	and	cultural	studies	can	typify	the	two	positions	 in	question:	Raymond	Williams	being	representative	of	 the	so	called	 ‘Society	Shaping	Technology’	(SST)	framework,	and	Marshall	McLuhan	of	the	so	called	‘technological	determinist’	position.	The	former,	being	chronologically	a	theoretical	response	to	the	latter,	characterises	the	leading	 trend	 in	 the	 discipline.	 Without	 entering	 into	 the	 detail	 of	 the	 many	 facets	 that	characterise	 these	perspectives,	 it	 is	possible	 to	distinguish	that,	 for	 the	SST	 framework,	media	and	 culture	 principally	 inheres	 in	 the	 social	 field;	 while,	 on	 the	 opposite,	 for	 the	 perspectives	leaded	 by	McLuhan,	 technology	 has	 its	 own	 capability	 to	 act	 on	 human	 society,	 conducing	 its	progression	via	technical	innovations.	See	Martin	Lister,	Jon	Dovey,	Seth	Giddings,	Iain	Grant	and	Kieran	 Kelly	 (eds.),	 New	 Media:	 A	 Critical	 Introduction,	 2nd	 edition	 (London	 &	 New	 York:	Routledge,	2009),	77-82;	Raymond	Williams,	Television:	Technology	and	Cultural	Form	(London	&	New	 York:	 Routledge,	 1974);	 Marshall	 McLuhan,	Understanding	 Media:	 The	 extensions	 of	 man	(Cambridge,	MA	&	London:	MIT	Press,	1994	[1964]).	19	 Anthropic	 self-referentiality	 is	 a	 common	 trait	 that	 traverses	 all	 the	 literature	 focusing	 on	hacker	culture.	20	 Many	 scholars	 uses	 the	 hack	 as	 an	 analytical	 entryway	 into	 the	 world	 of	 hacking;	 see	 for	instance	Jordan,	op.	cit.;	Turkle,	op.	cit;	Wark,	op.	cit.	21	I	use	the	word	‘assemblage’	here	as	this	is	conceptualised	by	Gilles	Deleuze	and	Félix	Guattari.	Assemblages	are	always	 ‘machinic’,	and	are	conceived	to	emphasise	the	set	of	connections	that	exist	 between	 heterogeneous	 elements	 (bodies,	 expressions,	 objects	 etc.),	 which	 momentarily	come	together,	originating	novel	functions	in	ensemble.	The	use	of	this	concept	is	hardly	possible	without	 referencing	 to	 the	whole	 theoretical	work	of	Deleuze	and	Guattari;	however,	 since	 the	
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‘machinic’	 relationality	 that,	 being	 crucial	 to	 avoid	 anthropocentred	comprehensions	of	 culture,	posits	 –	 conversely	–	 emphasis	on	 conjunction	and	reciprocal	co-constitutionality	and	co-emergence.		According	 to	 Sherry	 Turkle,	 the	 hack	 is	 the	 “Holy	 Grail”	 of	 hacker	 culture:	 a	“concept	 that	exists	 independently	of	 the	computer”.22	The	 ‘hack’	 still	 retains	a	sort	of	 ‘primordial’	sense	in	the	computer	underground:	a	creative	and	original	attempt	 to	 approach	 the	 technological	 object,	 ‘bending’	 it	 towards	 new	objectives,	 and	 pushing	 it	 towards	 unforeseen,	 personal	 and	 specific-to-the-situation	 orientations.23	 The	 ‘hack’	 is	 characterised	 by	 the	 ingenuity	 of	 the	exploration,	 aimed	 at	 shaping	 the	 use	 of	 the	 technological	 artefact,	 pushing	 it	beyond	its	limits	for	novel,	not-yet-thought-of	applications,	and	for	a	use	outside	the	limitations	posited	by	existing	rules.24	Thus,	it	is	a	material	re-appropriation	aimed	 at	 unconventional,	 ‘heretical’	 uses	 of	 technological	 apparatuses,	 via	 an	abstraction	of	the	actual	possibilities	pertaining	to	that	specific	technology.		Turkle	has	 identified	 the	most	 essential	 features	of	 the	hack.	 In	particular,	 she	underlines	 its	 aesthetic	 qualities,	 which	 are	 related	 to	 a	 ‘magic’	 allure	surrounding	 it.25	 This	 is	 an	 “aesthetics	 of	 technological	 transparency”,	 which	focuses	 on	 knowledge	 and	 mastery	 to	 render	 what,	 at	 first	 glance,	 may	 be	considered	 very	 complicated	 into	 a	 simple	 trick.26	 Thus,	 the	 hack	 can	 be	summarised	by	various,	distinctive	traits.	It	is	an	action	that	seems	very	simple,	yet	 creates	 astonishment.	 Using	 means	 that	 are	 often	 considered	 ordinary	 in	everyday	life,	it	can	be	sensational,	almost	spectacular.	It	is	a	sophisticated	act,	a	material	 gesture	 that	 requires	 a	 deep	 knowledge,	 not	 only	 of	 a	 single	technological	device,	but	also	of	the	system	in	which	it	is	actualised.	This	mastery	originates	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 knowledge	 acquired	 by	 an	 accurate	 and	devoted	study	of	the	system	in	all	its	parts.	Finally,	it	involves	unorthodox	uses	of	
																																																																																																																																																											ontological	movement	I	am	following	conforms	to	processual	and	relational	axes,	I	permit	myself	to	not	specify	its	development.	Similarly,	the	thematic,	conceptualisation	and	development	of	the	‘machine’	is	a	philosophical	task	that	moves	throughout	the	entire	work	of	Deleuze	and	Guattari.	There	is	not	here	the	space	to	fully	deal	with	it,	but	it	might	be	said	that	the	‘machine’	breaks	with	the	prosthetic	assumption	of	the	subject-object	relation	between	the	human-animal	and	his/her	tool;	 and	 it	 does	 this	 rupture	 through	 the	 recognition	of	 the	processes	 involving	 the	 ‘territory’	(see	footnote	65	below).	Within	machines,	materials	are	deterritorialised	to	form	novel	‘matters’,	but	 these	 do	 not	 enter	 into	 prosthetic	 relations	 (as	 tools)	 with	 a	 supposed	 subject.	 See	 Gilles	Deleuze	and	Félix	Guattari,	A	Thousand	Plateaus:	Capitalism	and	Schizophrenia,	transl.	B.	Massumi	(Minneapolis,	 MN:	 University	 of	Minnesota	 Press,	 1987	 [1980]);	 for	 critical	 accounts	 see	 John	Phillips,	“Agencement/Assemblage,”	Theory,	Culture	&	Society	23	(2006)	2–3:	108–109.	22	Turkle,	op.	cit.,	207.	23	 In	 one	 of	 the	most	 influential	 and	 referenced	 texts	 on	 hacker	 culture,	 Steven	 Levy	 narrates	many	 anecdotes	 that	 reveal	 the	 attitude	 towards	 curiosity	 and	 material	 application	characterising	 the	hack.	 See	 Steven	Levy,	Hackers:	Heroes	 of	 the	Computer	Revolution	 (London:	Penguin,	2001	[1984]).	24	Rules	that	are	technical	but,	in	capitalist	society,	obviously	also	legal.	25	Turkle,	op.	cit.,	208.	26	Ibid.	
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the	apparatuses	–	pointing	towards	unpredictable	possibilities:	virtual	points	of	abstraction.		It	 is	 precisely	 along	 these	 lines	 that	 the	 hack,	 as	 a	 material	 potency	 of	abstraction,	is	at	the	centre	of	the	Marxian	media	theory	of	McKenzie	Wark,	who	links	 it	 to	 a	 particular	 conceptualisation	 of	 nature.27	 “The	 hack	 expresses	 the	nature	of	nature	as	 its	difference	 from	itself	–	or	at	 least	 its	difference	 from	its	representation.	 The	 hack	 expresses	 the	 virtuality	 of	 nature	 and	 nature	 as	 the	virtuality	 of	 expression”.28	 Wark	 builds	 his	 understanding	 of	 contemporary	culture	on	the	hierarchical	overlapping	of	three	different	natures,	as	well	as	on	the	continual	historical	realisation	of	 their	virtual	abstracting	capabilities.	With	regard	 to	 a	 second	nature,	 one	based	on	 labour	 as	 a	 form	of	 emancipation	 for	survival	(the	material	life	as	already	posited	by	Marx),	Wark	overlaps	the	idea	of	a	 “third	 nature”.	 This	 is	 a	 space	 of	 information	 and	 communication,	 which	creates	 new	 necessities,	 instead	 of	 freeing	 human	 life	 from	 the	 needs	 already	created	by	working	under	the	capitalist	relation,	 in	the	representations	created	by	a	second	‘natural’	class	society.29		Hacking,	 then,	 is	 central	 to	 what	Wark	 characterises	 as	 the	 struggles	 of	 third	nature.	 Hackers	 have,	 in	 fact,	 an	 interest	 “in	 a	 nature	 expressing	 the	 limitless	multiplicity	 of	 things”.30	 It	 is	 upon	 this	 multiple	 potential	 that	 the	 abstracting	potency	of	the	hack	is	based.	The	key	political	point	for	Wark	is	that	the	hack	is	limited	via	the	extension	of	new	rules	imposed	by	a	burgeoning	dominant	class.	This	is	the	vectoral	class,	which	follows	the	capitalist	and	the	pastoralist	classes	before	 it,	 originating	 novel	 exploiting	 conditions	 which	 lead	 (or	 can	 virtually	lead)	to	class	conflicts.	These	innovative	forms	of	exploitation	are	settled	by	the	continual	expansion	of	the	institution	of	property	to	involve	information.	Hence,	vectoral	conflicts	still	move	around	the	question	of	property,	which	consolidates	the	monopolising	class	 rules	over	new	 forces	of	production	–	and	 in	particular	over	the	hack.31		I	suggest	it	is	relevant	to	maintain	the	central	position	of	the	hack,	as	an	applied	material	act	that	is	capable	of	abstracting	potentials.	However,	I	put	forward,	the	hack	 has	 to	 be	 posited	 less	 hierarchically	 and	 more	 ecologically	 within	 the	‘natural’	relations	originated	by	forms	of	power	such	as	those	that	emerge	with	the	mass	distribution	of	digital	networks.32	For	this	reason,	I	keep	to	one	side	the	
																																																						27	Wark,	 op.	 cit.;	 McKenzie	Wark,	Telesthesia:	 Communication,	 Culture	 and	 Class,	 (Cambridge	 –	Malden:	MA:	Polity	Press,	2012).	28	Wark,	op.	cit.,	2004,	140.	29	Wark,	op.	cit.,	2004;	2012.	30	Wark,	op.	cit.,	2004,	152.	31	Wark,	op.	cit.,	2004;	2012.	32	With	 ‘ecological’,	 I	 mean	 a	 perspective	 that	 implies	 scalar	 relationality	 beyond	 any	 form	 of	anthropocentrism,	 along	 the	 line	 that	 connects	 the	 ideas	 of	 Félix	 Guattari	 to	 more	 recent	
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dialectic	 of	 class	 opposition	 (which	 still	 resonates	 in	 the	 proposal	 of	Wark)	 in	favour	of	a	more	immanent	reading	of	political	frontlines,	where	resistance	can	become	an	active	force	of	media	intervention.	The	hack	is,	here,	pushed	towards	the	 differentiating	 multiplicity	 of	 hacktions,	 as	 networked	 media	 actions	 of	resistance.33		The	hack,	as	discussed,	presents	features	of	originality,	creative	invention	and	a	certain	refusal	of	constraint.	Nevertheless,	it	still	maintains	a	certain	position	of	humanist	 ‘externality’	 into	practically	approaching	 the	 technological	apparatus.	Its	 abstractive	 potency	 is	 surely	 a	 matter	 of	 invention,	 and	 this	 potency	 is	contingent,	since	it	emerges	from	the	specific	situation	faced	by	its	practitioner	–	hence,	immanently,	involving	human	and	non-human	bodies.	However,	this	kind	of	 invention	 frequently	 becomes	what	might	 be	 called	 a	 ‘beloved	 detachment’	from	 the	 technological	 system	 itself,	 without	 being	 entangled	 in	 planes	 of	 co-relationality.	 More	 crucially,	 under	 the	 material	 abstractions	 of	 the	 hack,	 the	technical	 machine	 is	 often	 bent	 by	 following	 a	 certain	 ‘personal’	 taste.	 This	means	that	 the	hack	reaches	points	of	high	efficiency,	even	 if	 these	points	were	not	assumed	to	be	in	the	system	itself.	In	this	way,	the	potency	of	creation	(the	active	 origination	 of	 new	 material	 relations,	 or	 its	 possibility),	 as	 well	 as	 the	emergent,	 re-actualised	 instabilities,	 can	 easily	 give	 life	 to	 new	 stable	 power	formations,	 as	 the	 reorganisation	 of	 capitalist	 exploitation	 on	 global	 networks	has	historically	demonstrated.			My	 proposal	 is	 to	 qualify	 ‘hacktions’	 as	media	 actions	 of	 resistance	 by	 driving	this	sort	of	ontology,	or	better	‘onto-epistem-ology’	of	the	hack	towards	points	of	
deficiency;	 which	 means	 avoiding	 the	 shifts	 that	 also	 historically	 allowed	 its	reorganisation	within	 ‘transparent’,	 efficient,	machinic	 networks	 of	 cooptation.	In	 an	 attempt	 to	 dispute	 the	 separation	 of	 ontology	 and	 epistemology,	 Karen	Barad	 calls	 ‘onto-epistem-ology’	 the	 possibility	 of	 “knowing”	 as	 “a	 material	practice	 of	 engagement”	 occurring	 “as	 part	 of	 the	 world	 in	 its	 differential	becoming”.34	 To	 avoid	 falling	 back	 into	 humanist	 paradigms	 it	 is,	 in	 fact,	necessary	 to	 overcome	 the	 binarisms	 that	 assume	 the	 object	 of	 knowledge	 as	
																																																																																																																																																											developments	of	 ‘media	ecologies’.	See	Félix	Guattari,	The	Three	Ecologies,	 transl.	 I.	Pindar	&	P.	Sutton	 (London	 &	 New	 Brunswick:	 The	 Athlone	 Press,	 2000	 [1989]);	 Mattew	 Fuller,	 Media	
Ecologies:	Materialist	 Energies	 in	 Art	 and	Technoculture	 (Cambridge,	MA	&	London:	MIT	Press,	2005).	33	 The	 term	 ‘hacktion’	 comes	 from	 Alexandra	 Samuel,	 who	 first	 introduced	 it,	 albeit	 without	conceptualising	it.	In	her	study,	a	hacktion	is	just	another	word	for	politically	oriented	hacking,	or	hacktivist	 media	 actions.	 Samuel’s	 work	 has	 the	 value	 of	 moving	 the	 emphasis	 from	 human	subjects	 to	 the	media	 actions	 of	 resistance.	 However,	 this	 emphasis	 vanishes	 by	 following	 the	attempt	of	 foreclosing,	reducing	and	selecting	 ‘hacktions’,	 rather	 than	 letting	 them	to	express	a	potential	 multiplicity	 of	 media	 technological	 relations.	 See.	 Alexandra	W.	 Samuel,	 “Hacktivism	and	the	Future	of	Political	Participation”	(PhD	diss.,	Harvard	University,	2004).	34	Karen	Barad,	Meeting	the	Universe	Halfway:	Quantum	Physics	and	the	Entanglement	of	Matter	
and	Meaning	(Durham	&	London:	Duke	University	Press,	2007),	89.	
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separated	 from	 the	 process	 of	 knowing	 –	 or,	 similarly,	 as	 I	 have	 argued	elsewhere,	 theory	 form	 practice	 –	 equally	 acknowledging	 the	 heterogeneous	plurality	 of	 becoming.35	 Within	 her	 diffractive	 method	 of	 approaching	 culture	beyond	 the	 limits	 of	 humanist	 ‘reflexivity’,	 the	 entangled	 materiality	 of	producing	 knowledge	 is	 for	 Barad	 inseparable	 from	 its	 relational	performativity.36	This	means,	correspondingly,	that	by	pushing	forward	the	hack,	I	am	not	presuming	to	be	detached	from	such	a	movement.	Rather,	I	attempt	to	generate	 a	 difference,	 attempting	 to	 avoid	 a	 hierarchisation	 between	what	 the	hack	is	and	how	it	can	be	comprehended,	since	theorising	is	always	an	embodied	and	material	practice;	an	entangled	particle	of	differential	becomings.		Going	back	to	the	hack	and	its	prominence	within	contemporary	forms	of	digital	media	 and	 network	 politics,	 it	 does	 not	 need	 to	 be	 detached	 from	 its	 creative	imagination,	 from	the	relational	aesthetics	that	 imply	it.	Rather,	the	hack	needs	to	 be	 appraised	 within	 a	 broader	 processual	 philosophical	 perspective;	 an	outlook	accounting	for	what	the	hack	might	become,	that	is,	by	reconsidering	its	capacity	of	acting	as	a	primer:	a	triggering,	material	gesture	that	can	be	virtually	capable	 of	 activating	 a	 certain	 set	 of	 resistant	 tendencies.	 Media	 actions	 of	resistance,	as	hacktions,	imply	the	hack,	but	differentiate	by	having	the	capability	of	becoming	something	else:	a	virtual	 set	of	emergent	and	disruptive	relations.	For	instance,	when	a	database	is	forced	to	gain	access	the	hack	might	originate	a	data	 leak,	which	is	not	an	unconditional	consequence,	having	as	well	a	political	potential	 that	 is	 not	 acknowledgeable	 in	 advance.	 In	 certain	 cases	 –	 as	 it	happened	 for	 hacktions	 such	 as	 the	 leaks	 that	 were	 ‘deployed’	 under	 the	Anonymous	moniker	against	Italian	police	in	2012	–	the	hack	became	something	different,	leading	to	dysfunctional	concatenations:	novel	weapons	in	the	arsenal	of	 digital	media	 resistances,	 a	 throttle	 in	 always-emergent	 hacktivist	machines	that	 intervene	 in	 ongoing	 political	 struggles.37	 The	 hack,	 as	 such,	 has	 to	 point	towards	a	certain	disruptive	criticality,	towards	a	thought	of	resistance	that	does	not	oppose	power	 face-to-face,	but	 that	proliferates	 in	 continual	 contingencies,	beyond	dualist,	or	dualist-plus-one,	dialectical	positions.		
2.	Acts	of	creation	|	acts	of	resistance		 Creating	 has	 always	 been	 something	 different	 from	communicating.	 What	 is	 important	 will	 be	 perhaps	 to	 create	
																																																						35	 See	 Alberto	Micali,	 “How	 to	 become	war	machine,	 or...	 a	 low	 hacktivist	 (un)methodology	 in	pieces,”	Networking	Knowledge	9	(2015)	1:	1-17.	36	Barad,	op.	cit.	37	 Here,	 I	 am	 referring	 to	 a	 leak	 that	 occurred	 the	 22nd	 of	 October	 2012	 that	 exposed	 the	modalities,	and	the	controlling	mechanisms,	through	which	Italian	police	(Polizia	di	Stato)	used	to	 destabilise	 local	 struggles	 such	 as	 those	 of	 the	 NoTav	 movement.	 A	 more	 thorough	engagement	 with	 this	 and	 other	 examples,	 which	 can	 clarify	 the	 conceptualisation	 and	application	of	the	concept	of	hacktions,	can	be	found	in	Micali,	op.	cit.,	2016.	
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some	vacuoles	of	non-communication,	some	switches,	to	escape	from	control.	 Gilles	Deleuze38		The	 concept	 of	 resistance	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 have	 a	 good	 reputation	 in	contemporary	 cultural	 theory.	 It	 is	 a	 concept	 that	 is	 frequently	 over-used	 and	abused,	typically	as	the	alter	ego	of	power.	In	a	dualistic	account,	where	there	is	power,	resistance	–	which	opposes	 it	–	can	always	be	found.	Such	a	conceptual	trend	 is	oriented	 towards	analysing	and	describing	 resistance	as	 a	 reactionary	disposition.	In	such	a	perspective,	resistance	is	a	tendency	that,	by	closing	on	its	own	 defence,	 keeps	 its	 position	 rather	 than	 affirming	 itself.	 Additionally,	 in	dialectical	 reasoning,	 when	 resistance	 does	 assert	 itself,	 launching	 its	 decisive	attack	against	power,	it	will	finally	fail	by	taking	power’s	place,	becoming	its	own	‘bogeyman’:	the	same	‘state’	form	it	was	challenging.		Franco	 Berardi	 provides	 a	 ‘theoretical	 narration’	 of	 his	 encounter	 with	 the	(Deleuzo)	 Guattarian	 conceptual	 machine,	 which	 is	 more	 than	 a	 classic	‘handbook’	about	the	thought	of	Félix	Guattari.39	His	‘tale’	begins	by	dealing	with	depression.	 This	 is	 a	 depression	 brought	 on	 by	 an	 increasing	 impossibility	 for	concepts	 to	 grasp	 the	 dispersive	 flow	 of	 a	 shared	 reality,	 which	 is	 in	 turn	increasingly	 dissolving	 under	 the	 attacks	 of	 schizophrenic	 capital.	 Having	experienced	 first-hand	 the	movement	 of	 1977	 in	 Bologna	 as	 the	 climax	 of	 the	explosion	of	a	communitarian	and	subversive,	proliferant	desire,	the	1980s	and	what	followed	would	reveal	for	‘Bifo’	the	impossibility	of	political	‘journeys’	with	an	equal	intensity.	This	is	the	depression	of	an	inconceivable	political	resistance:		 resistance	 is	 hopeless,	 because	 when	 you	 resist	 you	 are	 actually	defending	conceptual	configurations	that	have	already	lost	their	grip	on	the	world.	When	you	resist,	you	replace	desire	with	duty,	and	this	cannot	work	if	we	believe	in	a	kind	of	creationist	process.	Resistance	is	the	opposite	of	creationism.40		Berardi	posits	resistance	as	a	gesture	of	defensive	reaction.	He	regards	this	form	of	resistance	as	the	opposite	of	creation,	the	latter	being	engaged	with	an	always-active	 desire	 for	 new	 ‘encounters’.	 Hence,	 the	 matter	 here	 involves	 the	possibility	of	thinking	a	concept	of	resistance	by	being	aware	of	a	historical	and	philosophical	perspective	that	implies	and/or	frequently	suggests	the	end	of	this	concept,	endowing	 it	only	with	static	and	retrograde	(im)possibilities,	negating	
																																																						38	Gilles	Deleuze,	Negotiations,	transl.	by	M.	Joughin	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1995	[1972-1990]),	175;	translation	modified.	39	Franco	Berardi,	Félix	Guattari:	Thought,	Friendship	and	Visionary	Cartography	 (Basingstoke	–	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2008).	40	Ibid.,	13.	
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for	it	any	ascription	of	creative	inventiveness.	This	is	a	resistance	that	is	always	crushed;	on	the	one	hand	by	a	continual	capture	and	recapture	by	apparatuses	of	power	and,	on	the	other	hand,	by	a	(hyper)	critical	thought	which	underlines	–	by	amplifying	–	the	reactionary	nature	of	resistant	attitudes.		With	 the	 objective	 of	 reactivating	 a	 concept	 of	 resistance	 with	 a	 view	 to	employing	 this	 for	digital	media	actions,	 I	 suggest	 it	 is	necessary	 to	outline	 the	
active	 character	 of	 the	 forces	 moving	 within	 hacktions.	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 will	proceed	via	a	discussion	of	the	‘continental’	reading	of	Nietzsche.	Moreover,	it	is	on	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘creativity’	 that	 I	 propose	 the	 revitalisation	 of	 the	 concept	 of	resistance	has	to	be	based.	Even	though	creativity	nowadays	is	the	buzzword	par	
excellence	 of	 capitalist	 culture,	 it	 must	 be	 detached	 from	 the	 subjective,	individual	 state	 chosen	 for	 it	 by	 politicians,	 cultural	 managers	 and	entrepreneurs,	 who	 regularly	 inaugurate	 new	 forms	 of	 capitalist	 exploitation	around	this	concept.		First	of	all,	the	conceptualisation	of	hacktions	must	consider	how	such	emerging	processes	of	mediation	are	capable	of	being	–	or	better	–	‘becoming’	resistant	to,	and	not	supportive	of,	contemporary	forms	of	power.	From	such	a	viewpoint,	the	question	of	resistance	has	been	central	for	a	group	of	French	theorists	working	in	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	 last	 century	on	 crucial	questions	about	 subjectivation	and	 power.	 The	 concept	 of	 resistance	 needs,	 then,	 to	 be	 questioned,	 involving	what	 has	 been	 already	 introduced:	 that	 is,	 how	 to	 practically	 think	 about	 it	 in	order	to	revitalise	this	notion.	In	particular,	the	re-reading	of	Friedrich	Nietzsche	has	played	a	central	role	in	this	branch	of	continental	philosophy.41		Following	 the	 so-called	 ‘post-structuralist’	 reading	 of	Nietzsche,	 the	 concept	 of	resistance	can	be	read	from	two	opposite	directions.42	On	the	one	hand,	there	is	the	notion	of	resistance	to	domination.	This	 is	an	emancipatory	resistance,	one	that	directly	concerns	freedom,	and	the	possibilities	of	 liberation	from	a	power	over.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 resistance	 can	 also	 be	 the	 expression	 of	 this	 same	
																																																						41	 A	 summary	 of	 the	 various	 positions	 of	 the	 many	 post-structuralist	 theorists	 who	 re-approached	Nietzschean	thought	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study.	Instead,	I	will	deal	here	with	various	 points	 of	 this	 French	 reading,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 developing	 a	 conceptualisation	 of	resistance	that	can	allow	the	outlining	of	networked	media	actions	as	hacktions.	In	particular,	I	will	 focus	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Gilles	 Deleuze,	 which	 temporarily	 ‘opened’	 the	 French	 reading	 of	Nietzsche,	and	on	various	texts	and	interviews	present	in	two	collections	of	his	(alone	and	with	other	 interlocutors)	 writings.	 See	 Gilles	 Deleuze,	 Nietzsche	 and	 Philosophy,	 transl.	 by	 H.	Tomlinson	 (New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	 1983	 [1962]);	Desert	 Island	and	Other	Texts	
1953-1974,	 eds.	 D.	 Lapoujade,	 transl.	 by	M.	 Taormina	 (Los	 Angeles	&	New	York:	 Semiotext(e),	2004	[2002]);	Two	Regimes	of	Madness:	Text	and	Interviews	1975-1995,	eds.	D.	Lapoujade,	transl.	by	A.	Hodges	and	M.	Taormina	(Los	Angeles	&	New	York:	Semiotext(e),	2006	[2003]).	42	 David	 C.	 Hoy,	 Critical	 Resistance:	 From	 Poststructuralism	 to	 Post-Critique	 (Cambridge,	 MA	 &	London:	MIT	Press,	2004).	
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domination.	This	is	the	resistant	attempt	to	stop	and	limit	any	liberating	efforts:	this	is	the	resistance	of	repression.		In	 the	 preface	 of	 the	 American	 edition	 of	 his	 translated	 book	 on	 Nietzsche,	Deleuze	 identifies	 the	 key	 conceptual	 concern	 with	 the	 centrality	 of	 forces,	something	he	links	to	the	affective	thought	of	Spinoza.43	Deleuze	emphasises	that	Nietzsche	“invented	a	typology	of	 forces	which	distinguishes	active	forces	 from	reactive	 forces	 (those	 which	 are	 acted	 on)	 and	 analyzes	 their	 various	combinations”.44	 For	 Deleuze,	 Nietzschean	 thought	 is	 a	 step	 forward	 into	 the	affective	 (and	 unknown)	 capacities	 of	 bodies	 as	 introduced	 by	 Spinoza.45	Nietzsche’s	 thought	 recognises	 the	 presence	 of	 equally	 strong,	 but	 this	 time	reacting,	reactionary	forces.		In	 these	 terms,	 the	 central	 question	 for	 resistance	 regards	 the	 ‘quality’,	 the	direction	 of	 the	 forces	 living	 and	 enacting	 its	 deployment	 and	 its	 embodied	disposition.	 This,	 using	 Nietzschean	 terminology,	 involves	 the	 ‘will	 to	 power’,	‘potency’	 or	 power	 to,	 that	 is	 the	 differential	 between	 the	 forces	 in	 action.	Following	Deleuze,	since	“any	given	thing	refers	to	a	state	of	forces”,	‘potency’	is	the	 element	 that	 qualifies	 this	 as	 affirmative	 or	 negative:	 “affirmation”	 or	“negation”.46		It	is	worth	noting	that	‘affirmation’,	in	Deleuze’s	own	take	on	Nietzsche,	is	not	the	opposite	of	negation.	Implying	the	two	as	being	extremes	on	the	same	spectrum	would	mean	falling	once	again	into	dialectical	thinking.	Conversely,	Deleuze	does	not	 define	 affirmation	 through	 negation	 or	 opposition,	 but	 through	multiplication,	 the	 joyful	 playing	 of	 differences,	 that	 is	 heterogeneity	 as	 the	potency	 of	 releasing	 and	 freeing	 forces.	 In	 summary,	 crucially	 for	 the	characterisation	of	hacktions	as	media	forms	of	resistance,	affirmation	does	not	imply	acceptance	but	creation.	 It	 is	 this	creative	element,	as	an	 infra-subjective	one,	 which	 accompanies	 the	 deployment	 of	 media	 actions	 of	 resistance.	However,	before	going	on	to	discuss	this	creative	aspect,	it	is	vital	to	stay	focused	on	 resistance	 in	 order	 to	 highlight	 what	 allows	 Nietzsche	 –	 according	 to	 the	Deleuzian	reading	–	to	distinguish	between	active	and	reactive	forces.		This	 distinction	 is	 decisive,	 since	 it	 specifically	 involves	 a	 possible	characterisation,	 a	 posteriori,	 of	 resistance	 –	 avoiding,	 then,	 its	 normative	presupposition.	The	difference	between	the	two	introduced	forms	of	resistance	resides	precisely	in	the	quality	of	the	forces	that	populate	them.	For	Deleuze,	this	
																																																						43	Deleuze,	op.	cit.,	2004.	44	Ibid.,	204.	45	See	Gilles	Deleuze,	Cosa	può	un	corpo?	Lezioni	su	Spinoza,	3rd	ed.,	transl.	by	A.	Pardi	(Verona:	Ombre	Corte,	2013).	46	Deleuze,	op.	cit.,	2004,	205.	
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‘ethological’	issue	does	not	mean	that	the	character	of	the	form	of	resistance	has	to	 be	 questioned	 with	 regard	 to	 its	 essence.47	 Questioning	 the	 essence	 of	resistance	 would	 be	 enunciated	 as	 follow:	 ‘what’	 is	 the	 form	 of	 resistance	 in	question?	This	is	a	question	that	does	not	deal	with	the	disposition	of	the	forces	at	 stake.	On	 the	 contrary,	 the	value	of	 the	Nietzschean	 ‘image’	of	 thought	 is	 its	capacity	 to	 do	 “away	with	 all	 ‘personalist’	 references”.48	 This	 permits	 to	 avoid	any	 essentialist	 questioning	 of	 the	 forms	 of	 resistance	 focusing	 on	 a	 ‘de-individualised’	question	of	“who”.49	This	means	that	“‘[w]ho’	does	not	refer	to	an	individual	 or	person,	 but	 to	 an	 event,	 to	 relational	 forces	 in	 a	proposition	or	 a	phenomenon,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 a	 genetic	 relation	 that	 determines	 those	 forces”.50	Therefore,	to	distinguish	between	a	resistance	to,	and	a	resistance	of	domination,	it	will	be	relevant	considering	 the	 forces	 that	populate	resistant	media	actions,	recognising	 when	 the	 de-individual	 character	 of	 such	 forces	 is	 an	 active	 or	reactive	disposition.		David	 Hoy	 proposes	 a	 definition	 of	 resistance	 as	 being	 ‘critical’	 –	 critical	resistance	 –	 to	 characterise	 a	 form	 of	 resistance	 that	 directly	 deals	 with	critique.51	 Critique	 is,	 in	 fact,	 the	 central	 element	 recognised	 by	 Deleuze	 in	commenting	on	Nietzsche’s	genealogical	method.52	Nietzschean	critique	is	not	a	reactive,	 negative	mode	of	 inquiry:	 conversely	 it	 is	 an	 action,	 a	 positive,	 active	gesture,	 which	 is	 counterposed	 (by	 differentiation,	 and	 not	 dualistically)	 to	reactive	forms	such	as	resentment	or	revenge.		 Critique	is	not	a	re-action	of	re-sentiment	but	the	active	expression	of	an	 active	 mode	 of	 existence;	 attack	 and	 not	 revenge,	 the	 natural	aggression	 of	 a	way	 of	 being,	 the	 divine	wickedness	without	which	perfection	 could	 not	 be	 imagined.	 This	 way	 of	 being	 is	 that	 of	 the	philosopher	 precisely	 because	 he	 intends	 to	 wield	 the	 differential	element	as	critic	and	creator	and	therefore	as	a	hammer.53		‘Critique’	 is	 the	 crucial	 element	 for	 an	 active	 conceptualisation	 of	 resistance.	However,	 I	 do	 not	 agree	with	Hoy’s	 shift	 into	 considering	 interpretation	 as	 an	equally	 relevant	 matter	 for	 critique.	 Hoy	 draws	 together	 his	 theory	 of	 critical	resistance	 with	 recourse	 to	 Derridean	 deconstruction,	 identifying	 a	 non-universal	notion	of	 interpretation	 in	Nietzsche.	Although	 this	debate	 is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper,	I	nevertheless	suggest	that	critique,	according	to	Deleuze,	is	already	far	from	being	a	rational,	‘interpretative’	matter.	As	regards	a	‘mode	of	
																																																						47	Ibid.	48	Ibid.,	206.	49	Ibid.	50	Ibid.	51	Hoy,	op.	cit.	52	Deleuze,	op.	cit.,	1983.	53	Ibid.,	3;	emphasis	in	the	original.	
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existence’,	critique	directly	involves	an	active	state	of	forces,	which	needs	to	be	understood	in	affective	more	than	rational	terms	–	but	never	as	an	opposition.	In	this	 sense,	 I	 consider	 resistances	 (in	 plural)	 as	 being	 critical	 in	 proposing,	 or	better	 ‘disposing’,	 a	 set	 of	 immanent	 relations	 that	 can	 be	 qualified	 as	 being	active	in	the	potency	of	the	affective	qualities	that	are,	and	can	be,	activated.		Hacktions	 need	 to	 be	 studied	 through	 their	 processuality,	 where	 the	 being	materially	situated	of	hacking	practices	has	 to	be	considered	as	parts	of	media	resistances,	which	means	without	rigidly	separating	the	hack	from	the	possible	disruption	 of	 hacktions:	 the	 hack	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	 become	hacktion(s).	 This	directly	 implies	 an	 ‘ethological’	 field	 of	 study,	 where	 resistances	 can	 be	approached	 through	 a	 de-individualised	 questioning	 of	 the	 forces	 at	 stake	 in	media	interventions.	Indeed,	the	distinction,	between	active	and	reactive	forces,	permits	to	avoid	the	presumption	to	outlining	media	actions	a	priori,	 through	a	universalist	 objectivity.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 revitalisation	 of	 the	 concept	 of	resistance	that	I	suggest	has	to	implicate	critique,	as	an	active	recognition	of	the	disposition	of	the	forces	populating	hacktions.	Such	a	critical	resistance	does	not	deal	 with	 issues	 of	 representation	 or	 interpretation,	 being	 interested	 in	 the	relations	 that	 might	 be	 activated	 by	 forms	 of	 opposition	 and	 dissent	 on	 an	affective	register.		∞	Ethical	(and	aesthetical)	questions:	becoming-cosmic,	a	conclusion		 It	 might	 also	 be	 better	 here	 to	 speak	 of	 a	 proto-aesthetic	paradigm,	 to	 emphasise	 that	 we	 are	 not	 referring	 to	institutionalised	art,	 to	 its	works	manifested	 in	 the	social	 field,	but	to	a	dimension	of	creation	in	a	nascent	state,	perpetually	in	advance	 of	 itself,	 its	 power	 of	 emergence	 subsuming	 the	contingency	 and	 hazards	 of	 activities	 that	 bring	 immaterial	Universes	into	being.	A	residual	horizon	of	discursive	time	(time	marked	 by	 social	 clocks),	 a	 perpetual	 duration,	 escapes	 the	alternative	 of	 remembering-forgetting	 and	 lives	 with	 a	stupefying	intensity,	the	affect	of	territorialised	subjectivity.	Félix	Guattari54		The	active	disposition	of	forces	populating	resistance,	as	it	emerged	from	the	last	section,	involves	a	field	of	creation.	I	have	introduced	this	issue	without	detailing	it	 by	 recognising	 the	 differentiating	 nature	 of	 affirmation	 in	 a	 context	 of	heterogenesis.	 This	 point	 needs	 to	 be	 specified	 here,	 permitting	 a	 clearer	outlining	 of	 hacktions	 as	 media	 actions	 of	 resistance	 in	 relation	 to	 creativity.	
																																																						54	 Félix	 Guattari,	 Chaosmosis:	 An	 Ethico-Aesthetic	 Paradigm,	 transl.	 by	 P.	 Bains	 and	 J.	 Pefanis	(Indianapolis:	Indiana	University	Press,	1995	[1992]);	101-102.	
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Indeed,	 a	 crucial	 consideration	 regarding	 resistance	 in	 its	 critical	 and	 active	definition	 involves	 ethical	 questions.	 According	 to	 both	 David	 Hoy	 and	 Todd	May,	the	ethicality	of	resistance	is	a	key	element	for	a	post-structuralist	positing	of	this	concept.55	Resistance	in	fact	involves,	and	is	in	consonance	with,	a	wider	framework	 that	 fosters	 ideas	 such	 as	 emancipation	 or	 freedom.	 This	problematises	the	fact	that	these	notions	–	as	empty	constructs	–	can	be	critically	questioned.	 For	 this	 reason,	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 Guattarian	 ethico-aesthetic	paradigm	 is	 vital	 here.	 In	 addition,	 Félix	 Guattari’s	 paradigmatic	 positing	 of	ethical	and	aesthetical	questions	allows	to	move	the	argument	in	the	direction	of	creativity,	 due	 to	 the	 emphasis	 he	 places	 on	 aesthetic	 ambits	 in	 their	experimental	 and	 non-individual	 features:	 territories	 that	 are	 open	 to	 plural	processes	of	semiotisation,	having	the	capacity	to	involve	‘cosmic’	forces.		According	 to	 a	 rationalist	 critique,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 question	 the	 normative	validity	 of	 a	 notion	 of	 resistance	 in	 accordance	 with	 other	 concepts,	 such	 as	freedom	 or	 emancipation.	 From	 a	 rationalist	 perspective,	 for	 resistance	 to	 be	valid	 it	 has	 to	 follow	 ideals	 of	 justice	 or	 freedom	which	 can	 be	 recognised	 as	universally	accepted	–	 think,	 for	 instance,	 about	 the	 idea	of	perpetual	peace	as	suggested	 by	 Kant.56	 Even	 though	 I	 have	 suggested	 a	 concept	 of	 resistance(s),	this	 can	 be	 rationally	 attacked	 because	 of	 the	 fragile	 base	 of	 the	 normative	content	it	may	miss.	We	might	call	this	critique	as	the	‘rule’	of	the	majority,	the	normative	 guiding	 principle	 that	 a	minoritarian	 thought	 attempts	 to	 smooth.57	The	 fact	 is	 that	 –	 following	 Nietzsche	 and	 his	 readers	 –	 resistance	 does	 not	invoke	 any	 universalism	here.	 This	 is	why	 it	 is	 important	 to	 regard	 resistance	through	 what	 Guattari	 calls	 an	 ethico-aesthetic	 paradigm,	 one	 which	 can	dismantle	 any	 fascist,	 humanist	 and	 universalist	 reasoning,	 inclining	 instead	towards	the	idea	of	a	sort	of	cosmic,	post-human	and	‘affecting’	creativity.		Guattarian	 ‘ecosophy’	 is	 characterised	 by	 its	 emphasis	 on	 the	 necessity	 of	paradigms	oriented	towards	ethical	and	aesthetical	dimensions,	which	can	‘care’	about	 singularities	 in	 their	 exclusive,	 plural,	 continual	 and	 processual	‘differentiation’.58	 Such	 paradigms	 can	 in	 fact	 limit	 the	 becoming	 rigid	 of	subjectivities,	 favouring	 conversely	 heterogeneous	 processes	 of	 subjectivation.	An	analogous	paradigm	is	not	ethical	in	accordance	with	a	superior	rationality;	it	points,	on	 the	contrary,	 to	 the	necessity	of	virtually	setting	ethical	 coordinates,	
																																																						55	Hoy,	op.	cit.;	Todd	May,	The	Political	Philosophy	of	Poststructuralist	Anarchism	(University	Park,	PA:	The	Pennsylvania	State	University	Press,	1994).	56	 Immanuel	Kant,	To	Perpetual	Peace:	a	Philosophical	Sketch	 (Indianapolis:	Hackett	Publishing,	2003	[1795]).	57	 About	 the	 ‘minor’	 see	 Gilles	 Deleuze	 and	 Félix	 Guattari,	 Kafka:	 Toward	 a	 Minor	 Literature,	transl.	by	D.	Polan	(Minneapolis	&	London:	University	Of	Minnesota	Press,	1986	[1975]),	esp.	ch.	3;	Gilles	Deleuze	&	Claire	Parnet,	Dialogues,	transl.	by	H.	Tomlinson	and	B.	Habberjam	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1987	[1977]).	58	See	Guattari,	op.	cit.,	2000;	and	Félix	Guattari,	“Qu’est-ce	que	l’écosophie?”	Terminal	56	(1991),	22-23.	
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frameworks	 that	 have	 yet	 to	 come	 and	 cannot	 be	 universally	 arranged.	 This	constitutes	 a	 sort	 of	 ‘moving’	 ethic	 of	 the	 virtual,	 of	 the	 potency	 of	 essence	 in	what,	 following	 Spinoza	 and	 his	 readers,	 is	 an	 ethological	 framework.59	 For	Guattari,	ethics	is	a	question	of	ecological	responsibility	for	the	cosmos,	with	its	vital	 affective	 species	 of	 corporal	 and	 incorporeal	 constituents.	 This	 involves	aesthetic	 dimensions	 of	 creation,	 as	 a	 capacity	 to	 prompt	 active	 forces	 of	resistance.60		The	dimension	of	artistic	creation	possesses,	 in	 fact,	 for	Guattari,	residuals	that	are	 distinctive	 of	 societies	 in	 which	 the	 processes	 of	 subjectivation	 were	polysemous,	animist	and	trans-individual.61	These	“societies	without	writing	or	state”	were	in	fact	characterised	by	what	might	be	called	‘territorialised’,	or	‘not	discerning’	 assemblages	 of	 various	 activities,	 such	 as	 economic,	 artistic,	 ritual,	magic,	 religious	 or	 other	 activities.62	Within	 such	 social	 contexts,	 the	 aesthetic	dimension	was	 not	 a	 separate	 sphere	 of	 individual	 psychic	 formation.	 Art	was	not	 a	 specific	 activity,	 ‘separated	 from	 the	 context’,	 while	 forming	 part	 of	 the	immanent	acting	of	the	socius	–	a	constituent	part	of	social	relationships.	Thus,	the	creative	dimension	of	art	is	capable	of	recalling	the	dimensions	that	Guattari	calls	 of	 non-structuralised,	 open	 and	 affective	 semiotisation.63	 The	 aesthetic	ambit	 therefore,	 being	 a	 field	 of	 affects,	 is	 an	 ambit	 in	 which	 foyers,	 nuclei	 or	fires,	 of	 resistance	 endure.	 These	 are	 processual	 nuclei	 which	 can	 allow	 re-singularisations	 and	 heterogeneses,	 which	 are	 processes	 of	 opening	 towards	‘possibles’,	 and	 not	 of	 what	 might	 be	 called	 ‘calcification’,	 standardisation	 or	‘fascistisation’	 as	 occurs	 under	 the	 enslavement	 of	 aesthesis	 to	 the	 capitalist	Signifier	 –	 which	 for	 Guattari	 is	 a	 universal	 value	 that	 works	 as	 a	 semiotic	operator	over	life	flows.64	It	is	crucial	that	these	resistant	fires	are	traversed	by	what	Guattari	defines	as	an	“aesthetic	puissance	of	 feeling”.65	This	 is,	again,	 the	creative	potency	as	a	‘power	to’	that	has	a	privileged	–	in	the	sense	of	active	and	of	possible	–	position,	precisely	due	to	its	capability	regarding	virtual,	open	and	transversal	processualities.		
																																																						59	Readers	such	as	Deleuze	and	Guattari	as	well	as	Negri	or	Braidotti.	See	 for	 instance	Antonio	Negri,	 L’Anomalia	 Selvaggia:	 saggio	 su	 potere	 e	 potenza	 in	 Baruch	 Spinoza	 (Milan:	 Feltrinelli,	1981);	Braidotti,	op.	cit.	60	Guattari,	op.	cit.,	1995;	and	Guattari,	op.	cit.,	2000.	61	I	am	using	the	past	tense	here,	but	it	is	key	to	note	that	Guattari	is	always	careful	to	underline	nonlinear	 readings	 of	 history,	 since	 such	 processes	 re-emerge	 within	 different	 societies	 and	never	characterise	a	definite	historical	stage.	62	Guattari,	op.	cit.,	1995,	101.	63	It	must	be	highlighted	that,	by	following	Guattari,	 I	am	always	implying	a	context	of	semiotic	pluralism.	See,	Ibid.;	and	Lazzarato,	op.	cit.	64	 Guattari,	 op.	 cit.,	 1995;	 Félix	 Guattari,	 Capitale	 Mondiale	 Integrato	 (Verona:	 Ombre	 Corte,	1997).	65	Guattari,	op.	cit.,	1995,	101.	
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This	is	how	the	ambit	of	creation	needs	to	be	thought	within	the	processuality	of	media	actions	of	resistance,	when	the	hack	might	become	a	hacktion,	via	–	what	following	 Deleuze	 and	 Guattari	 might	 be	 called	 –	 its	 ‘deterritorialisation’	 and	‘reterritorialisation’	 in	 disruptive	 contingencies.66	 The	 territories	 that	relationally	 compose	 and	 border	 the	 material,	 applied	 gesture	 of	 the	 hack	processually	move	to	originate	novel	sets	of	relations,	new	territories,	which	will	be	 disorderly	 and	 turbulent,	 rather	 than	 highly	 functional.	 I	 suggest	 the	 hack	needs	 to	be	 ‘reoriented’	and	pointed	towards	 ‘machinic’	disruptions,	moving	to	hacktions.	If	this	is	not	done	(both	in	theory	and	practice,	beyond	any	dualism),	the	 abstractions	 capable	 of	 being	 originated	 by	 media	 hacking	 practices	 will	comfortably	terminate	in	the	welcoming	hands	of	apparatuses	of	capture.	Hence,	creation	 cannot	 be	 assumed	 to	 be	 an	 individual	 state.	 Creation	 does	 in	 fact	constantly	 re-emerge	 in	 processes	 that	 are	 trans-individual,	 plural	 and	 open.	
Creativity	is	not	human:	it	is	cosmological.		To	conclude,	then,	networked	media	actions	as	hacktions	are	resistant	since	they	express	 the	 creative	 capability	 of	 ‘machinising’	 certain	 affections,	 words,	practices	 and/or	 involvements,	 transversally	 populated	 by	 active,	 and	 not	reactive	 forces.	 Hacktions	 heretically	 resist	 the	 rationality	 of	 the	 state,	 which	would	 label	 them	 as	 being	 irrational,	 criminal	 and	 immoral	 because	 of	 their	distance	from	the	liberal	majoritarian	way	of	doing	politics	via	digital	media	and	networks	 (post	 your	 profile	 badge,	 sign	 the	 petition,	 receive	 your	 weekly	newsletter).	 These	 networked	 media	 actions	 are	 emergent	 and	 dysfunctional,	they	are	blossoming	events,	and	their	field	of	intervention	is	what,	with	Deleuze	and	Guattari,	 can	be	called	a	micropolitics	 ‘in-becoming’:	 a	plane	of	action	 that	implies	 subjectivation	 as	 a	 non-anthropocentred	 relational	 process.	 Creation	traverses	hacktions,	from	media	hacking	as	a	material	practice,	to	its	abstractive	potential;	a	resistant	potency	that	 is	capable	of	activating	 lines	that	have	yet	to	come,	 forming	disruptive	conditions	 that	have	not	been	already	 thought	of	nor	imagined:	a	heterogeneity	of	resistances	in	media	ecologies.		
																																																						66	 These	 terms	 are	 correlative,	 and	 are	 conceived	 by	 Deleuze	 and	 Guattari	 in	 relation	 to	 the	broader	thematic	of	the	‘territory’,	which	traverses	all	their	work.	The	concept	of	the	territory	is	used	 in	 broader	 terms	 compared	 with	 its	 usage	 in	 Ethology	 and	 Ethnology.	 In	 the	 words	 of	Guattari:	 “Territory	 is	 synonymous	 with	 appropriation,	 subjectification	 closed	 in	 on	 itself.	 A	territory	 can	 also	 be	 deterritorialised,	 i.e.	 open	 up,	 to	 be	 engaged	 in	 lines	 of	 flight,	 and	 even	become	 self-destructive.	 Reterritorialisation	 consists	 of	 an	 attempt	 to	 recompose	 a	 territory	engaged	in	a	process	of	deterritorialisation”.	Félix	Guattari,	The	Anti-Oedipus	Papers,	trans.	by	K.	Gotman	(New	York:	Semiotext(e),	2006),	421.	
